### **East Cambridgeshire District Council**



# Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

Mid-year Review Report 2016-17

#### 1 Background

The Council operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management function is to ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital programme. The capital programme provides a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

Accordingly, treasury management is defined as:

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

#### 2 Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2011) was adopted by the Council.

The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

- 1. Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
- 2. Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
- 3. Receipt by the full council of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy for the year ahead, a Midyear Review Report and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
- Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
- 5. Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is Finance and Governance Committee:

This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:

- An economic update for the first part of the 2016/17 financial year;
- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- · The Council's capital expenditure (prudential indicators);
- A review of the Council's investment portfolio for 2016/17;
- A review of the Council's borrowing strategy for 2016/17;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2016/17;
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2016/17.

#### 3 Economics and interest rates

#### 3.1 Economics update

UK GDP growth rates in 2013 of 2.2% and 2.9% in 2014 were strong but 2015 was disappointing at 1.8%, though it still remained one of the leading rates among the G7 countries. Growth improved in quarter 4 of 2015 from +0.4% to 0.7% but fell back to +0.4% (2.0% y/y) in quarter 1 of 2016 before bouncing back again to +0.7% (2.1% y/y) in quarter 2. During most of 2015, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation during the year of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, plus the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme. The referendum vote for Brexit in June this year delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys, pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, subsequent surveys have shown a sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys, though it is generally expected that although the economy will now avoid flat lining, growth will be weak through the second half of 2016 and in 2017.

The Bank of England meeting on August 4th addressed this expected slowdown in growth by a package of measures including a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%. The Inflation Report included an unchanged forecast for growth for 2016 of 2.0% but cut the forecast for 2017 from 2.3% to just 0.8%. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (i.e. without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting and suggested that the Government will need to help growth by increasing investment expenditure and possibly by using fiscal policy tools (taxation). The new Chancellor Phillip Hammond announced after the referendum result, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 will be eased in the Autumn Statement on November 23.

The Inflation Report also included a sharp rise in the forecast for inflation to around 2.4% in 2018 and 2019. CPI has started rising during 2016 as the falls in the price of oil and food twelve months ago fall out of the calculation during the year and, in addition, the post referendum 10% fall in the value of sterling on a trade weighted basis is likely to result in a 3% increase in CPI over a time period of 3-4 years. However, the MPC is expected to look thorough a one off upward blip from this devaluation of sterling in order to support economic growth, especially if pay increases continue to remain subdued and therefore pose little danger of stoking core inflationary price pressures within the UK economy.

The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the growth rate leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 disappointed at +0.8% on an annualised basis while quarter 2 improved, but only to a lacklustre +1.4%. However, forward indicators are pointing towards a pickup in growth in the rest of 2016. The Fed. embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase which is now strongly expected in December this year.

In the Eurozone, the ECB commenced in March 2015 its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month; this was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise from around zero towards the target of 2%. GDP growth rose by 0.6% in quarter 1 2016 (1.7% y/y) but slowed to +0.3% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2. This has added to comments from many forecasters that central banks around the world are running out of ammunition to stimulate economic growth and to boost inflation. They stress that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand in the their economies and economic growth.

Japan is still bogged down in anaemic growth and making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy while Chinese economic growth has been weakening and medium term risks have been increasing.

#### 3.2 Interest rate forecasts

The Council's treasury advisor, Capita Asset Services, has provided the following forecast:

	NOW	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75
3 month LIBID	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90
6 month LIBID	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
12 month LIBID	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40
5 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.70
25 yr PWLB	3.00	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.10	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40
50 yr PWLB	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.10	3.10	3.20

In view of recent market developments in terms of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee meeting in early-November and the recent outcome of the US Elections, Capita Asset Services has recently revised its interest rate forecast and is now forecasting that Bank Rate will remain at 0.25% until the second quarter of 2019. Mark Carney, has repeatedly stated that increases in Bank Rate will be slow and gradual after they do start. The MPC is concerned about the impact of increases on many heavily indebted consumers, especially when the growth in average disposable income is still weak and could well turn negative when inflation rises during the next two years to exceed average pay increases.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. An eventual world economic recovery may also see investors switching from the safe haven of bonds to equities. However, we have been experiencing exceptional levels of volatility in financial markets which have caused significant swings in PWLB rates. Our PWLB rate forecasts are based on the Certainty Rate (minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1<sup>st</sup> November 2012.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK remains to the downside. Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Monetary policy action reaching its limit of effectiveness and failing to stimulate significant sustainable growth, combat the threat of deflation and reduce high levels of debt in some major developed economies, combined with a lack of adequate action from national governments to promote growth through structural reforms, fiscal policy and investment expenditure.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- Emerging country economies, currencies and corporates destabilised by falling commodity prices and / or Fed. rate increases, causing a further flight to safe havens (bonds).
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners the EU and US.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

# 4 Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy update

The Revised Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2016/17 was approved by this Council on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2016.

There are no policy changes to the TMSS; the details in this report update the position in the light of the updated economic position and budgetary changes already approved.

#### 5 The Council's Capital Position (Prudential Indicators)

This part of the report is structured to update:

- The Council's capital expenditure plans;
- · How these plans are being financed;
- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

#### 5.1 Prudential Indicator for Capital Expenditure

This table shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure and the changes since the capital programme was agreed at the Budget.

Capital Expenditure by Service	2016/17 Approved Estimate June 2016 £'000	2016/17 Current Position £'000	2016/17 Revised Estimate £'000	
Regulatory and Support Services	1,232	196	1,232	
Commercial Services	7,165	1,011	7,909	
Total capital expenditure	8,397	1,207	9,141	

#### 5.2 Changes to the Financing of the Capital Programme

The table below draws together the main strategy elements of the capital expenditure plans (above), highlighting the original supported and unsupported elements of the capital programme, and the expected financing arrangements of this capital expenditure. The borrowing element of the table increases the underlying indebtedness of the Council by way of the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), although this will be reduced in part by revenue charges for the repayment of debt (the Minimum Revenue Provision). This direct borrowing need may also be supplemented by maturing debt and other treasury requirements.

Capital Expenditure	2016/17 Approved Estimate June 2016 £'000	2016/17 Revised Estimate £'000	
Total capital expenditure	8,397	9,141	
Financed by:			
Capital grants	473	473	
Capital reserves / receipts	2,906	2,858	
Revenue	735	735	
Total financing	4,114	4.066	
Internal Borrowing requirement	4,283	5,075	

Funding for the Leisure Centre and the LATC can be achieved through internal borrowing. Previously, it has been assumed that funding the LATC will be done via external debt. However, due to the improvement in the Council's cash position, it is now projected that external debt can be avoided. This means that the Council will not exposed itself to external debt - with higher rates of interest. However, should the level of cash balances reduce further, then the Council will need to consider raising debt externally. Such a decision will be made based on the projections at the time.

Due to the current low level of interest on investment and the potential additional cost of borrowing, in the short-term the Council will continue to borrow internally.

## 5.3 Changes to the Prudential Indicators for the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), External Debt and the Operational Boundary

The table below shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose. It also shows the expected debt position over the period, which is termed the Operational Boundary.

#### Prudential Indicator – Capital Financing Requirement

We are on target to achieve the original forecast Capital Financing Requirement

#### Prudential Indicator – the Operational Boundary for external debt

	2016/17 Approved Estimate June 2016 £'000	2016/17 Revised Estimate £'000
Prudential Indicator - Capital Financing	Requirement	
Total CFR	4,283	5,075
Net movement in CFR	4,283	5,075
Prudential Indicator – the Operational Be	oundary for external deb	t
Borrowing	4,283	5,075
Other long term liabilities	0	0
Total debt (year end position)	4,283	5,075

#### 5.4 Limits to Borrowing Activity

The first key control over the treasury activity is a prudential indicator to ensure that over the medium term, net borrowing (borrowings less investments) will only be for a capital purpose. Gross external borrowing should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years. The Council has approved a policy for borrowing in advance of need which will be adhered to if this proves prudent.

	2016/17 Approved Estimate June 2016 £'000
Borrowing	4,283
Other long term liabilities	0
Total debt	4,283
CFR* (year end position)	4,283

The Resources Director reports that no difficulties are envisaged for the current or future years in complying with this prudential indicator.

A further prudential indicator controls the overall level of external borrowing. This is the Authorised Limit which represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited, and needs to be set and revised by Members. It reflects the level of borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. It is the expected maximum borrowing need with some headroom for unexpected movements. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003.

Authorised limit for external debt	2016/17 Indicator £'000		
Borrowing	5,000		
Other long term liabilities	0		
Total	5,000		

#### 6 Investment Portfolio

In accordance with the Code, it is the Council's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with the Council's risk appetite. As set out in Section 3, it is a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in line with the current 0.25% Bank Rate. The continuing potential for a re-emergence of a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis together with other risks which could impact on the creditworthiness of banks, prompts a low risk strategy. Given this risk environment, investment returns are likely to remain low.

The Council held £23.5m of investments as at 30<sup>th</sup> September 2016 (£19.1m at 31 March 2016) and the investment portfolio yield for the first 6 months of the year is 0.54% against a benchmark *of 0.52%*.

A full list of investments held as at 30 September 2016 is in appendix 2.

Interest rates on offer to the Council from Money Market Deposits at times have been lower than the Council's Corporate Cash Manager Plus with Natwest. To maximise the interest receipts generated on investments balances in the Natwest Sweep account have been higher than in previous years. This approach complies with the Treasury Management Strategy.

The Chief Financial Officer confirms that the approved limits within the Annual Investment Strategy were not breached during the first 6 months of 2016/17.

The Council's budgeted investment return for 2016/17 is £100,000 (full year), and performance for the year to date is projected to be £10,000 above budget.

#### Investment Counterparty criteria

The current investment counterparty criteria selection approved in the TMSS is meeting the requirement of the treasury management function.

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. Commencing in 2015, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, all three agencies have begun removing these "uplifts" with the timing of the process determined by regulatory progress at the national level. The process has been part of a wider reassessment of methodologies by each of the rating agencies. In addition to the removal of implied support, new methodologies are now taking into account additional factors, such as regulatory capital levels. In some cases, these factors have "netted" each other off, to leave underlying ratings either unchanged or little changed. A consequence of these new methodologies is that they have also lowered the importance of the (Fitch) Support and Viability ratings and have seen the (Moody's) Financial Strength rating withdrawn by the agency.

In keeping with the agencies' new methodologies, the rating element of our own credit assessment process now focuses solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. While this is the same process that has always been used for Standard & Poor's, this has been a change in the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. It is important to stress that the other key elements to our process, namely the assessment of Rating Watch and Outlook information as well as the Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay have not been changed.

The evolving regulatory environment, in tandem with the rating agencies' new methodologies also means that sovereign ratings are now of lesser importance in the assessment process. Where through the crisis, clients typically assigned the highest sovereign rating to their criteria, the new regulatory environment is attempting to break the link between sovereign support and domestic financial institutions. While this authority understands the changes that have taken place. This is in relation to the fact that the underlying domestic and where appropriate, international, economic and wider political and social background will still have an influence on the ratings of a financial institution.

It is important to stress that these rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status or credit quality of the institution. They are merely reflective of a reassessment of rating agency methodologies in light of enacted and future expected changes to the regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. While some banks have received lower credit ratings as a result of these changes, this does not mean that they are suddenly less credit worthy than they were formerly. Rather, in the majority of cases, this mainly reflects the fact that implied sovereign government support has effectively been withdrawn from banks. They are now expected to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to be able to withstand foreseeable adverse financial circumstances without government support. In fact, in many cases, the balance sheets of banks are now much more robust than they were before the 2008 financial crisis when they had higher ratings than now. However, this is not universally applicable, leaving some entities with modestly lower ratings than they had through much of the "support" phase of the financial crisis.


#### 7 Borrowing

The Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2016/17 is £4.283m. The CFR denotes the Council's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing).

The graph and table below show the movement in PWLB certainty rates for the first six months of the year to date:

PWLB certainty rates 1 April 2016 to  $\mathbf{30}^{\mathrm{TH}}$  September 2016

	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
1/4/16	1.13%	1.62%	2.31%	3.14%	2.95%
30/9/16	0.83%	1.01%	1.52%	2.27%	2.10%
Low	0.81%	0.95%	1.42%	2.08%	1.87%
Date	07/09/2016	10/08/2016	10/08/2016	12/08/2016	30/08/2016
High	1.20%	1.80%	2.51%	3.28%	3.08%
Date	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016
Average	0.99%	1.33%	1.92%	2.69%	2.46%



#### **APPENDIX 1: Investments**

#### Investment performance year to 30 September 2016

Benchmark	Benchmark Return (LIBID Uncompounded)	Council Performance	Investment Interest Earned		
6 month	0.52%	0.54%	£59,666.01		

