

# **Treasury Management Strategy Statement**

## **Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy**

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East Cambridgeshire District Council  
2019/20

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# 1.INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day-to-day treasury management activities.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

Revised reporting is required for the 2019/20 reporting cycle due to revisions of the MHCLG Investment Guidance, the MHCLG Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Guidance, the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code. The primary reporting changes include the introduction of a capital strategy, to provide a longer-term focus to the capital plans, and greater reporting requirements surrounding any commercial activity undertaken under the Localism Act 2011. The capital strategy is being reported separately as part of the Budget Report.

## 1.2 Reporting requirements

### 1.2.1 Capital Strategy

The CIPFA revised 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require, for 2019-20, all local authorities to prepare an additional report, a capital strategy report, which will provide the following:

- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability.

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the Full Council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

This capital strategy is reported separately from the Treasury Management Strategy Statement; non-treasury investments will be reported through the former. This ensures the separation of the core treasury function under security, liquidity and yield principles, and the policy and commercialism investments usually driven by expenditure on an asset. The capital strategy will show where applicable:

- The corporate governance arrangements for these types of activities;
- Any service objectives relating to the investments;
- The expected income, costs and resulting contribution;
- The debt related to the activity and the associated interest costs;
- The payback period (MRP policy);
- For non-loan type investments, the cost against the current market value;
- The risks associated with each activity.

Where a physical asset is being bought, details of market research, advisers used, (and their monitoring), on-going costs and investment requirements and any credit information will be disclosed, including the ability to sell the asset and realise the investment cash.

Where the Council has borrowed to fund any non-treasury investment, there should also be an explanation of why borrowing was required and why the MHCLG Investment Guidance and CIPFA Prudential Code have not been adhered to.

From an East Cambridgeshire perspective, it is important that the Capital Strategy is proportionate to the Council's objectives in this area. The Council has no long term capital objectives at this time, with the medium term capital programme focusing on the achievement of the Council's Corporate Plan objectives aimed at improving the service and quality of life for residents of the District. The Capital Strategy is therefore incorporated into the Revenue Budget, Capital Strategy and Council Tax paper also being considered by Members at this meeting.

### **1.2.2 Treasury Management reporting**

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

- a. Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
  - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
  - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
  - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
  - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

- b. A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c. An annual treasury report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **Scrutiny**

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Full Council. This role is undertaken by the Resources and Finance Committee.

## **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2019/20**

The strategy for 2019/20 covers two main areas:

### **Capital issues**

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

### **Treasury management issues**

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

## **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. The current planning of the member induction programme following the May 2019 elections will include training to members on the treasury management function.

The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

## **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## 2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2019/20 – 2021/22

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### 2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital expenditure £000	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Regulatory Services	1,991	1,585	1,621	2,654	772
Community Services	3,143	1,643	2,315	29	29
Leisure Centre	11,012	794	0	0	0
Resources and Finance	86	303	6,330	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,232</b>	<b>4,325</b>	<b>10,266</b>	<b>2,683</b>	<b>801</b>

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Financing of capital expenditure £000	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Capital Receipts	1,524	842	261	261	261
Capital Grants	1,741	873	6,842	511	511
CIL / Section 106	1,676	549	435	29	29
Revenue	215	99	0	0	0
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>11,076</b>	<b>1,962</b>	<b>2,728</b>	<b>1,882</b>	<b>0</b>

### 2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge that broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

£000	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>					
<b>CFR brought forward</b>	2,448	13,524	15,386	17,487	12,204
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	11,076	1,863	2,101	-5,283	-874
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>13,524</b>	<b>15,386</b>	<b>17,487</b>	<b>12,204</b>	<b>11,330</b>

<b>Movement in CFR represented by</b>					
Net financing need for the year (above)	11,076	1,962	2,728	1,882	0
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	0	-99	-627	-665	-874
Repayment of loan by ECTC	0	0	0	-6,500	0
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>11,076</b>	<b>1,863</b>	<b>2,101</b>	<b>-5,283</b>	<b>-874</b>

### 2.3 Core funds and expected investment balances

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources £m	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Fund balances / reserves	11,804	10,464	9,050	6,606	7,509
Capital Receipts	773	721	510	299	88
Section 106	2,565	1,965	1,365	765	165
<b>Total core funds</b>	<b>15,142</b>	<b>13,150</b>	<b>10,925</b>	<b>7,670</b>	<b>7,762</b>
Working capital*	2,932	2,932	2,932	2,932	2,932
Internal Borrowing	-13,524	-13,387	-9,488	-7,205	-6,331
<b>Expected investments</b>	<b>4,550</b>	<b>2,695</b>	<b>4,369</b>	<b>3,397</b>	<b>4,363</b>

\*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end and are based on those at the end of 2017/18.

### 2.4 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an **MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

**Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3);

Asset life's used in MRP calculations are:

Waste fleet	9 years
Leisure Centre	20 years
Depot	25 years
ECTC Loan	No MRP provision is made on the loan to the Company as this will be repaid by the Company as a bullet payment in March 2021, with the cash being used by the Council to reduce the Capital Financing Requirement at this point.

This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life.

### 3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

#### 3.1 Current portfolio position

The treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2018 was that the Council held £4,550,000 of cash in Money Market overnight Funds and was external debt free.

The up-dated position at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018 was that the Council remained external debt free, with the amount invested in Money Market Funds having increased to £9,550,000. This reflects to some degree the income / expenditure flows of the Council as a collection authority. Council Tax tends to be collected in the first ten months of the year, but the money we pay out to precepting authorities is more evenly spaced, with indeed one Council Tax collection date and two precept payment dates in the final quarter of the year. However, with the delay of some capital projects the expected external debt at the end of the year is now forecast as £2,000,000, rather than the £5,000,000 reported previously.

The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£000	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
<b>External Debt</b>					
Debt at 1 <sup>st</sup> April	0	0	2,000	8,000	5,000
Expected change in Debt	0	2,000	6,000	-3,000	0
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	0	0	0	0	0
Actual gross debt at 31 March	<b>0</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>8,000</b>	<b>5,000</b>	<b>5,000</b>
The Capital Financing Requirement	<b>13,524</b>	<b>15,387</b>	<b>17,488</b>	<b>12,205</b>	<b>11,331</b>
Under borrowing	<b>13,524</b>	<b>13,387</b>	<b>9,488</b>	<b>7,205</b>	<b>6,331</b>

Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2019/20 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Finance Manager reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

### 3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

**The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources. For East Cambs. this is the same value as the CFR (see previous table).

Operational boundary £000	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Debt	15,387	17,488	12,205	11,331
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,387</b>	<b>17,488</b>	<b>12,205</b>	<b>11,331</b>

**The authorised limit for external debt.** This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the Full Council. It reflects the level of external debt, which while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised limit £000	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Debt	10,000	15,000	15,000	10,000
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,000</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>10,000</b>

### 3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22
Bank Rate View	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	2.00%
3 Month LIBID	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%
6 Month LIBID	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%
12 Month LIBID	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.10%	2.20%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

The flow of generally positive economic statistics after the quarter ended 30 June meant that it came as no surprise that the MPC came to a decision on 2 August to make the first increase in Bank Rate above 0.5% since the financial crash, from 0.5% to 0.75%. Growth became increasingly strong during 2018 until slowing significantly during the last quarter. At their November quarterly Inflation Report meeting, the MPC left Bank Rate unchanged, but expressed some concern at the Chancellor's fiscal stimulus in his Budget, which could increase inflationary pressures. However, it is unlikely that the MPC would increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit. On a major assumption that Parliament and the EU agree a Brexit deal in the first quarter of 2019, then the next increase in Bank Rate is forecast to be in May 2019, followed by increases in February and November 2020, before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022.

The overall longer run future trend is for gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, to rise, albeit gently. However, over about the last 25 years, we have been through a period of falling bond yields as inflation subsided to, and then stabilised at, much lower levels than before, and supported by central banks implementing substantial quantitative easing purchases of government and other debt after the financial crash of 2008. Quantitative easing, conversely, also caused a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and purchased riskier assets. In 2016, we saw the start of a reversal of this trend with a sharp rise in bond yields after the US Presidential election in November 2016, with yields then rising further as a result of the big increase in the US government deficit aimed at stimulating even stronger economic growth. That policy change also created concerns around a significant rise in inflationary pressures in an economy which was already running at remarkably low levels of unemployment. Unsurprisingly, the Fed has continued on its series of robust responses to combat its perception of rising inflationary pressures by repeatedly increasing the Fed rate to reach 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. It has also continued its policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds as a result of quantitative easing, when they mature. We therefore saw US 10 year bond Treasury yields rise above 3.2% during October 2018 and also investors causing a sharp fall in equity prices as they sold out of holding riskier assets. However, by early January 2019, US 10 year bond yields had fallen back considerably on fears that the Fed was being too aggressive in raising interest rates and was going to cause a recession. Equity prices have been very volatile on alternating good and bad news during this period.

From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

## Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2019/20 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.
- Borrowing interest rates have been volatile so far in 2018-19 and while they were on a rising trend during the first half of the year, they have backtracked since then until early January. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when authorities may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

### 3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2019/20 treasury operations. The Finance Manager will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.*
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.*

Any decisions will be reported to the Resources and Finance Committee at the next available opportunity.

### 3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

### **3.6 Municipal Bond Agency**

It is possible that the Municipal Bond Agency will be offering loans to local authorities in the future. The Agency hopes that the borrowing rates will be lower than those offered by the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). This Authority may make use of this new source of borrowing as and when appropriate.

## 4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

### 4.1 Investment policy – management of risk

The MHCLG and CIPFA have extended the meaning of ‘investments’ to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets, if appropriate, would be covered in the Capital Strategy (a separate report), although this Council has none of these at this time.

The Council’s investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG’s Guidance on Local Government Investments (“the Guidance”)
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 (“the Code”)
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018.

The Council’s investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.
2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as “**credit default swaps**” and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
4. This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are two lists in appendix 5.3 under the categories of ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments.
  - **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.
  - **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use.

5. **Non-specified investments limit.** The Council has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure to non-specified investments as being £1 million of the total investment portfolio, (see paragraph 4.3).
6. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the matrix table in paragraph 4.2.
7. **Transaction limits** are set for each type of investment in 4.2.
8. This authority will set a limit for the amount of its investments which are invested for **longer than 365 days**, (see paragraph 4.4).
9. Investments will only be placed with counterparties from countries with a specified minimum **sovereign rating**, (see paragraph 4.3).
10. This authority has engaged **external consultants**, (see paragraph 1.5), to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.
11. All investments will be denominated in **sterling**.

As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2018/19 under **IFRS 9**, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years commencing from 1.4.18.)

However, this authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 4.5). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

#### **Changes in risk management policy from last year.**

The above criteria are changed from last year.

#### **4.2 Creditworthiness policy**

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit Watches and credit Outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to

determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

The Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information other than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances, consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored weekly. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Link Asset Services. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

\* Please note: the yellow colour category is for UK Government debt, or its equivalent, money market funds and collateralised deposits where the collateral is UK Government debt –see appendix 5.4.

The following counterparty limits were agreed in the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy, the same limits will be applied in 2019/20.

- £6 million with counterparties rated 6 months to 1 year (Orange) duration limit
- £5 million with Money Market Funds
- £4 million with counterparties rated 3 months (Green) duration limit on the approved weekly list

## UK banks – ring fencing

The largest UK banks, (those with more than £25 billion of retail / Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) deposits), are required, by UK law, to separate core retail banking services from their investment and international banking activities by 1st January 2019. This is known as “ring-fencing”. Whilst smaller banks with less than £25 billion in deposits are exempt, they can choose to opt up. Several banks are very close to the threshold already and so may come into scope in the future regardless.

Ring-fencing is a regulatory initiative created in response to the global financial crisis. It mandates the separation of retail and SME deposits from investment banking, in order to improve the resilience and resolvability of banks by changing their structure. In general, simpler, activities offered from within a ring-fenced bank, (RFB), will be focused on lower risk, day-to-day core transactions, whilst more complex and “riskier” activities are required to be housed in a separate entity, a non-ring-fenced bank, (NRFB). This is intended to ensure that an entity’s core activities are not adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.

While the structure of the banks included within this process may have changed, the fundamentals of credit assessment have not. The Council will continue to assess the new-formed entities in the same way that it does others and those with sufficiently high ratings, (and any other metrics considered), will be considered for investment purposes.

### 4.3 Country limits

Due care will be taken to consider the exposure of the Council’s total investment portfolio to non-specified investments, countries, groups and sectors.

- a) **Non-specified investment limit.** The Council has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure to non-specified investments as being £1 million of the total investment portfolio.
- b) **Country limit.** The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK and from countries with a **minimum sovereign credit rating of AA-** from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.4. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.
- c) **Other limits.** In addition:
  - no more than 40% will be placed with any non-UK country at any time;
  - limits in place above will apply to a group of companies;
  - sector limits will be monitored regularly for appropriateness.

### 4.4 Investment strategy

**In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.
- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

**Investment returns expectations.**

Bank Rate is forecast to increase steadily but slowly over the next few years to reach 2.00% by quarter 1 2022. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.25%
- 2020/21 1.50%
- 2021/22 2.00%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

	<b>Now</b>
2018/19	0.75%
2019/20	1.00%
2020/21	1.50%
2021/22	1.75%
2022/23	1.75%
2023/24	2.00%
Later years	2.50%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

**Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicator and limit:

<b>Upper limit for principal sums invested for longer than 365 days</b>			
<b>£000</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>
Principal sums invested for longer than 365 days	2,000	2,000	2,000

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access, money market funds and short-dated deposits, (overnight to 100 days), in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

#### **4.5 Investment risk benchmarking**

These benchmarks are simple guides to maximum risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the mid-year or Annual Report.

Security - The Council's main priority is the security of its capital, and therefore security risk continues to be its main focus, with the process for securing this detailed in Section 4.1 of this report.

This is measured / benchmarked by the use of a Historic Risk of Default calculation provided to us by Link Asset Services. The calculation is a proxy for the average percentage risk for each investment based on over 30 years of data provided by Fitch, Moody's and S&P. It simply provides a calculation of the possibility of average default against the historical default rates, adjusted for the time period within each year according to the maturity of the investment. At the end of December 2018 our calculated Historic Risk of Default was 0.00% as all of our cash was in MMF and a liquid call account. As this situation is not expected to change in 2019-20, then the risk remains very small.

Liquidity – in respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- No Bank overdraft
- Liquid short term deposits of at least £5 million available with a week's notice.

Yield – The Council will use the 7-day LIBID compounded rate as an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio during 2019/20.

#### **4.6 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## 5 APPENDICES

(These can be appended to the report or omitted as required)

1. Prudential and treasury indicators and MRP statement
2. Economic background
3. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management (option 1)
4. Approved countries for investments
5. Treasury management scheme of delegation
6. The treasury management role of the Section 151 officer

## 5.1 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2019/20 – 2021/22 AND MRP STATEMENT

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### 5.1.1 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

#### Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

%	2017/18 Actual	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate
Annual Charge	0.919	1.381	6.009	1.412	0.799

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

While the above table is a statutory requirement for the Strategy document, when considering the increases in the cost of capital as a proportion of the revenue budget, it should be remembered that none of these costs has a direct impact of the Council's bottom line budget.

- Borrowing in relation to the Leisure centre is being funded initially from the use of reserves, but from 2020/21 from the management fee to be paid to the Council by the operator of the centre.
- The capital cost of the waste fleet and depot improvements will be charged to East Cambs Street Scene
- The loan to East Cambs Trading Company is generating an income to the Council as interest is being charged on this loan at a commercial rate of 5.22%.

### 5.1.2 Maturity structure of borrowing

Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2019/20		
	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	0%	100%
12 months to 2 years	0%	100%
2 years to 5 years	0%	100%
5 years to 10 years	0%	100%
10 years to 50 years	0%	100%

<b>Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2019/20</b>		
	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	0%	100%
12 months to 2 years	0%	100%
2 years to 5 years	0%	100%
5 years to 10 years	0%	100%
10 years to 50 years	0%	100%

## 5.2 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

**GLOBAL OUTLOOK.** World growth has been doing reasonably well, aided by strong growth in the US. However, US growth is likely to fall back in 2019 and, together with weakening economic activity in China and the Eurozone, overall world growth is likely to weaken.

**Inflation** has been weak during 2018 but, at long last, unemployment falling to remarkably low levels in the US and UK has led to an acceleration of wage inflation. The US Fed has therefore increased rates nine times and the Bank of England twice. However, the ECB is unlikely to start raising rates until late in 2019 at the earliest.

### **KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures**

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as quantitative easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

**The key issue now** is that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation, is coming towards its close. A new period is well advanced in the US, and started more recently in the UK, of reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and, (for the US), reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of a reduction in spare capacity in the economy and of unemployment falling to such low levels, that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. Consequently, prices in both bond and equity markets rose to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This meant that both asset categories were exposed to the risk of a sharp downward correction and we did, indeed, see a sharp fall in equity values in the last quarter of 2018. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery, by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, conversely, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.** At the time of writing, (early January 2019), financial markets are very concerned that the Fed is being too aggressive with its policy for raising interest rates and is likely to cause a recession in the US economy.

The world economy also needs to adjust to a sharp change in **liquidity creation** over the last five years where the US has moved from boosting liquidity by QE purchases, to reducing its holdings of debt (currently about \$50 billion per month). In addition, the European Central Bank ended its QE purchases in December 2018.

**UK.** The flow of positive economic statistics since the end of the first quarter of 2018 has shown that pessimism was overdone about the poor growth in quarter 1 when adverse weather caused a temporary downward blip. Quarter 1 at 0.1% growth in

GDP was followed by a return to 0.4% in quarter 2 and by a strong performance in quarter 3 of +0.6%. However, growth in quarter 4 is expected to weaken significantly.

At their November quarterly Inflation Report meeting, the MPC repeated their well-worn phrase that future Bank Rate increases would be gradual and would rise to a much lower equilibrium rate, (where monetary policy is neither expansionary or contractionary), than before the crash; indeed they gave a figure for this of around 2.5% in ten years' time, but declined to give a medium term forecast. However, with so much uncertainty around Brexit, they warned that the next move could be up or down, even if there was a disorderly Brexit. While it would be expected that Bank Rate could be cut if there was a significant fall in GDP growth as a result of a disorderly Brexit, so as to provide a stimulus to growth, they warned they could also raise Bank Rate in the same scenario if there was a boost to inflation from a devaluation of sterling, increases in import prices and more expensive goods produced in the UK replacing cheaper goods previously imported, and so on. In addition, the Chancellor could potentially provide fiscal stimulus to support economic growth, though at the cost of increasing the budget deficit above currently projected levels.

It is unlikely that the MPC would increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit. Getting parliamentary approval for a Brexit agreement on both sides of the Channel will take well into spring 2019. However, in view of the hawkish stance of the MPC at their November meeting, the next increase in Bank Rate is now forecast to be in May 2019, (on the assumption that a Brexit deal is agreed by both the UK and the EU). The following increases are then forecast to be in February and November 2020 before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022.

**Inflation.** The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measure of inflation has been falling from a peak of 3.1% in November 2017 to 2.1% in December 2018. In the November Bank of England quarterly Inflation Report, inflation was forecast to still be marginally above its 2% inflation target two years ahead, (at about 2.1%), given a scenario of minimal increases in Bank Rate.

The **labour market** figures in November were particularly strong with an emphatic increase in total employment of 141,000 over the previous three months, unemployment at 4.0% at a 43 year low on the Independent Labour Organisation measure, and job vacancies hitting an all-time high, indicating that employers are having major difficulties filling job vacancies with suitable staff. It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation continued at its high point of 3.3%, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates less CPI inflation), earnings are currently growing by about 1.2%, the highest level since 2009. This increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. This tends to confirm that the MPC was right to start on a cautious increase in Bank Rate in August as it views wage inflation in excess of 3% as increasing inflationary pressures within the UK economy.

In the **political arena**, the Brexit deal put forward by the Conservative minority government was defeated on 15 January. It is unclear at the time of writing, how this situation will move forward. However, our central position is that Prime Minister May's government will endure, despite various setbacks, along the route to reaching an orderly Brexit though the risks are increasing that it may not be possible to get full agreement by the UK and EU before 29 March 2019, in which case this withdrawal date is likely to be pushed back to a new date. If, however, the UK faces a general election in the next 12 months, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary and fiscal policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up.

**USA.** President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy is fuelling a (temporary) boost in consumption which has generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth which rose from 2.2% (annualised rate) in quarter 1 to 4.2% in quarter 2 and 3.5%, (3.0% y/y), in quarter 3, but also an upturn in inflationary pressures. The strong growth in employment numbers and the reduction in the unemployment rate to 3.9%, near to a recent 49 year low, has fed through to an upturn in wage inflation which hit 3.2% in November. However, CPI inflation overall fell to 2.2% in November and looks to be on a falling trend to drop below the Fed's target of 2% during 2019. The Fed has continued on its series of increases in interest rates with another 0.25% increase in December to between 2.25% and 2.50%, this being the fifth increase in 2018 and the ninth in this cycle. However, they did also reduce their forecast for further increases from three to two. This latest increase compounded investor fears that the Fed is over doing the speed and level of increases in rates and that it is going to cause a US recession as a result. There is also much evidence in previous monetary policy cycles of the Fed's series of increases doing exactly that. Consequently, we have seen stock markets around the world falling under the weight of fears around the Fed's actions, the trade war between the US and China and an expectation that world growth will slow.

The tariff war between the US and China has been generating a lot of heat during 2018; it has the potential to significantly damage world growth if an agreement is not reached during the current three month truce declared by President Trump to hold off from any further tariff increases.

**Eurozone.** Growth was 0.4% in quarters 1 and 2 but fell back to 0.2% in quarter 3, though this was probably just a temporary dip. In particular, data from Germany has been mixed and it could be negatively impacted by US tariffs on a significant part of its manufacturing exports e.g. cars. Current forward indicators for economic growth and inflation have now been on a downward trend for a significant period, which will make it difficult for the ECB to make any start on increasing rates until 2020 at the earliest. Indeed, the issue now is rather whether the ECB will have to resort to new measures to boost liquidity in the economy in order to support growth. Having halved its quantitative easing purchases of debt in October 2018 to €15 billion per month, the European Central Bank ended all further purchases in December 2018. In its January 2019 meeting, it made a point of underlining that it will be fully reinvesting all maturing debt for an extended period of time past the date at which it starts raising the key ECB interest rates.

**China.** Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems. Progress has been made in reducing the rate of credit creation, particularly from the shadow banking sector, which is feeding through into lower economic growth. There are concerns that official economic statistics are inflating the published rate of growth.

**Japan** - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. It is likely that loose monetary policy will endure for some years yet to try to stimulate growth and modest inflation.

**Emerging countries.** Argentina and Turkey are currently experiencing major headwinds and are facing challenges in external financing requirements well in excess of their reserves of foreign exchange. However, these countries are small in terms of the overall world economy, (around 1% each), so the fallout from the expected recessions in these countries will be minimal.

## INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 3.2 are **predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU**. On this basis, while GDP growth is likely to be subdued in 2019 due to all the uncertainties around Brexit depressing consumer and business confidence, an agreement is likely to lead to a boost to the rate of growth in 2020 which could, in turn, increase inflationary pressures in the economy and so cause the Bank of England to resume a series of gentle increases in Bank Rate. Just how fast, and how far, those increases will occur and rise to, will be data dependent. The forecasts in this report assume a modest recovery in the rate and timing of stronger growth and in the corresponding response by the Bank in raising rates.

- In the event of an **orderly non-agreement exit**, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall.
- If there was a **disorderly Brexit**, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields correspondingly. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

However, there would appear to be a majority consensus in the Commons against any form of non-agreement exit so the chance of this occurring has now substantially diminished.

### The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are broadly dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed for ten years since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

### Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England monetary policy** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**, possibly in **Italy**, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system, and due to the election in March of a government which has made a lot of anti-austerity noise. The EU rejected the initial proposed Italian budget and demanded cuts in government spending which the Italian government initially refused. However, a fudge was subsequently agreed, but only by *delaying* the planned increases in expenditure to a later year. This can have therefore only been kicked down the road to a later time. The rating

agencies have started on downgrading Italian debt to one notch above junk level. If Italian debt were to fall below investment grade, many investors would be unable to hold it. Unsurprisingly, investors are becoming increasingly concerned by the words and actions of the Italian government and consequently, Italian bond yields have risen – at a time when the government faces having to refinance large amounts of debt maturing in 2019.

- **Weak capitalisation of some European banks.** Italian banks are particularly vulnerable; one factor is that they hold a high level of Italian government debt - debt which is falling in value. This is therefore undermining their capital ratios and raises the question of whether they will need to raise fresh capital to plug the gap.
- **German minority government.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Then in October 2018, the results of the Bavarian and Hesse state elections radically undermined the SPD party and showed a sharp fall in support for the CDU. As a result, the SPD is reviewing whether it can continue to support a coalition that is so damaging to its electoral popularity. After the result of the Hesse state election, Angela Merkel announced that she would not stand for re-election as CDU party leader at her party's convention in December 2018, (a new party leader has now been elected). However, this makes little practical difference as she is still expected to aim to continue for now as the Chancellor. However, there are five more state elections coming up in 2019 and EU parliamentary elections in May/June; these could result in a further loss of electoral support for both the CDU and SPD which could also undermine her leadership.
- **Other minority Eurozone governments.** Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium all have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile. Sweden is also struggling to form a government due to the anti-immigration party holding the balance of power, and which no other party is willing to form a coalition with. The Belgian coalition collapsed in December 2018 but a minority caretaker government has been appointed until the May EU wide general elections.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU while **Italy**, in 2018, also elected a strongly anti-immigration government. Elections to the EU parliament are due in May/June 2019.
- Further increases in interest rates in the US could spark a **sudden flight of investment funds** from more risky assets e.g. shares, into bonds yielding a much improved yield. Throughout the last quarter of 2018, we saw sharp falls in equity markets interspersed with occasional partial rallies. Emerging countries which have borrowed heavily in dollar denominated debt, could be particularly exposed to this risk of an investor flight to safe havens e.g. UK gilts.
- There are concerns around the level of **US corporate debt** which has swollen massively during the period of low borrowing rates in order to finance mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in the debt of many large corporations being downgraded to a BBB credit rating, close to junk status. Indeed, 48% of total investment grade corporate debt is now rated at BBB. If such corporations fail to generate profits and cash flow to reduce their debt levels as expected, this could tip their debt into junk ratings which will increase their cost of financing and further negatively impact profits and cash flow.
- **Geopolitical risks**, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **Brexit** – if both sides were to agree by 29 March a compromise that quickly removed all threats of economic and political disruption and so led to an early boost to UK economic growth.
- **The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets** through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of QE, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation**, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

### **Brexit timetable and process**

- March 2017: UK government notified the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50 on 29 March 2019.
- 25.11.18 EU27 leaders endorsed the withdrawal agreement
- Dec 2018 vote in the UK Parliament on the agreement was postponed
- 21.12.18 – 8.01.19 UK parliamentary recess
- 15.01.19 Brexit deal defeated in the Commons vote by a large margin
- 28.01.19 Second vote on a slightly amended deal
- By 29.03.19 another vote (?) in UK parliament
- By 29.03.19 if the UK Parliament approves a deal, then ratification by the EU Parliament requires a simple majority
- By 29.03.19 if the UK and EU parliaments agree the deal, the EU Council needs to approve the deal; 20 countries representing 65% of the EU population must agree
- 29.03.19 Either the UK leaves the EU, or asks the EU for agreement to an extension of the Article 50 period if the UK Parliament has been unable to agree on a Brexit deal.
- 29.03.19: if an agreement is reached with the EU on the terms of Brexit, then this will be followed by a proposed **transitional period ending around December 2020**.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy may leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.

- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.

### 5.3 TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (TMP) – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of £1 million will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment.

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made, it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	£ limit per institution	Max. maturity period
DMADF – UK Government	N/A	unlimited	6 months
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA (or state your criteria if different)	£5 million	6 months
Money Market Funds CNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Money Market Funds LNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Money Market Funds LVNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Money Market Funds VNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Local authorities	N/A	£5 million	12 months
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	£6 million £6 million £6 million £4 million Nil	12 months 12 months 6 months 100 days Not for use
Term deposits with UK part nationalised banks	See above		

**Accounting treatment of investments.** The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To

ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** A maximum of £1 million will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

1. Maturities of ANY period

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	Maximum investment	Max. maturity period
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities: - Structured deposits	Orange	In-house	£1 million	1 Year

2. Maturities in excess of 1 year

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	Maximum investment	Max. maturity period
Term deposits – local authorities	--	In-house	£1 million	Unlimited
Term deposits – banks and building societies	Purple	In-house	£1 million	2 Years

#### **5.4 APPROVED COUNTRIES FOR INVESTMENTS**

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link Asset Services credit worthiness service.

##### ***Based on lowest available rating***

###### AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

###### AA+

- Finland
- U.S.A.

###### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Hong Kong
- U.K.

###### AA-

- Belgium
- Qatar

## **5.5 TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION**

### **(i) Full Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Resources and Finance Committee (as the responsible body)**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) The Section 151 Officer (as the person with responsibility for treasury scrutiny)**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

## **5.6 THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER**

### **The S151 (responsible) Officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long term timeframe
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices that specifically deal with how non-treasury investments will be carried out and managed.