

# **Treasury Management Strategy Statement**

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement  
and Annual Investment Strategy

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East Cambridgeshire District Council  
2021/22

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# 1.INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

This authority has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no non-treasury investments other than the loans to East Cambridgeshire Trading Company.

## 1.2 Reporting requirements

### 1.2.1 Capital Strategy

The CIPFA 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report which will provide the following:

- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

## 1.2.2 Treasury Management reporting

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

- a. **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
  - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
  - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
  - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
  - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).
  
- b. **A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
  
- c. **An annual treasury report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### Scrutiny

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Finance and Assets Committee.

## 1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22

The strategy for 2021/22 covers two main areas:

### Capital issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

### Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

#### **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny.

The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

#### **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Link Group, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented and subjected to regular review.

## 2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2021/22 – 2023/24

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### 2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

<b>Capital expenditure £000</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate</b>
Operational Services	1,054	1,166	3,687	841	841
Finance & Assets	1,310	7,549	140	40	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,364</b>	<b>8,715</b>	<b>3,827</b>	<b>881</b>	<b>881</b>

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

<b>Financing of capital expenditure £000</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate</b>
Capital receipts	525	646	266	266	266
Capital grants	526	608	526	526	526
Section 106 & CIL	1,832	1,035	89	89	89
Revenue	13	89	0	0	0
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>-532</b>	<b>6,337</b>	<b>2,946</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### 2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each asset's life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the lease provider and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has no such schemes within the CFR.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

£000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>					
<b>CFR Brought Forward</b>	14,486	11,761	11,178	13,731	9,013
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>-2,725</b>	-583	2,553	-4,718	-1,479
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>11,761</b>	<b>11,178</b>	<b>13,731</b>	<b>9,013</b>	<b>7,534</b>

<b>Movement in CFR represented by</b>					
Net financing need for the year (above)	-532	6,337	2,946	0	0
Repayment of Loan by ECTC	-1,700	-6,500	0	-4,070	-830
Less MRP and other financing movements	-493	-420	-393	-648	-649
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>2,725</b>	<b>-583</b>	<b>2,553</b>	<b>-4,718</b>	<b>-1,479</b>

### 2.3 Core funds and expected investment balances

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources £000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
Fund balances / reserves	9,625	9,079	7,230	3,719	4,330
Capital receipts	1,385	839	623	408	192
Provisions	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449
Section 106 / CIL	5,487	6,052	5,952	5,852	5,752
Working capital*	4,692	4,692	4,692	4,692	4,692
Internal borrowing	-11,761	-11,178	-13,731	-9,013	-7,534
<b>Expected investments</b>	<b>10,877</b>	<b>10,933</b>	<b>6,215</b>	<b>7,107</b>	<b>8,881</b>

\*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end; these may be higher mid-year

### 2.4 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an **MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

The Council had no outstanding borrowing from before 1 April 2008

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing the MRP policy will be **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance

with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3);

Asset lives' used in MRP calculations are:

Waste Fleet	9 years
Leisure Centre	25 years
Depot	25 Years
ECTC Loan	No MRP provision is made on the loans to ECTC as the loans will be repaid by the Company in line with the loan agreements and used to reduce the Council's Capital Financing Requirement at that time.

This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing requirement in line with the asset's expected life.



### 3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

#### 3.1 Current portfolio position

The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2020 was that the Council had £10.877 million of treasury investments, and had no external borrowing.

Banks	£3.094 million
Local Authorities	£1.000 million
Money Market Funds	£6.783 million

The up-dated position at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020 was that the Council remained external debt free, with £23.937 million invested as detailed below.

Banks	£7.657 million
Money Market Funds	£16.280 million

This reflects, to some degree, the income / expenditure flows of the Council as a collection authority. Council Tax tends to be collected in the first ten months of the year, but the money we pay out to precepting authorities is more evenly spaced, with one Council Tax collection date and two precept payment dates in the final quarter of the year. This year, however, it also reflects the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Council's finances, with Government paying a number of grants earlier in the year than they would normally have done and also providing the Council with funding in advance to pay out grants to local businesses.

The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£m	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
<b>External Debt</b>					
Debt at 1 April	0	0	0	0	0
Expected change in Debt	0	0	0	0	0
Actual gross debt at 31 March	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
The Capital Financing Requirement	<b>11,761</b>	<b>11,178</b>	<b>13,731</b>	<b>9,013</b>	<b>7,534</b>
Under / (over) borrowing	<b>11,761</b>	<b>11,178</b>	<b>13,731</b>	<b>9,013</b>	<b>7,534</b>

Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early

borrowing for future years but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Finance Manager reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

### 3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

**The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

<b>Operational boundary £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate</b>
External Debt	0	0	0	0
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

**The authorised limit for external debt.** This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

<b>Authorised limit £m</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate</b>
External Debt	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,000</b>	<b>10,000</b>	<b>10,000</b>	<b>10,000</b>

### 3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 11.8.20. However, following the conclusion of the review of PWLB margins over gilt yields on 25.11.20, all forecasts below have been reduced by 1%. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps:

Link Group Interest Rate View		9.11.20											
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20													
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- Please note that we have made a slight change to our interest rate forecasts table above for forecasts for 3, 6 and 12 months. Traditionally, we have used LIBID forecasts, with the rate calculated using market convention of 1/8th (0.125%) taken off the LIBOR figure. Given that all LIBOR rates up to 6m are currently running below 10bps, using that convention would give negative figures as forecasts for those periods. However, the liquidity premium that is still in evidence at the short end of the curve means that the rates actually being achieved by local authority investors are still modestly in positive territory. While there are differences between counterparty offer rates, our analysis would suggest that an average rate of around 10 bps is achievable for 3 months, 10bps for 6 months and 20 bps for 12 months.
- During 2021, Link will be continuing to look at market developments in this area and will monitor these with a view to communicating with clients when full financial market agreement is reached on how to replace LIBOR. This is likely to be an iteration of the overnight SONIA rate and the use of compounded rates and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates for forecasting purposes.
- We will maintain continuity by providing clients with LIBID investment benchmark rates on the current basis.

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings to 16<sup>th</sup> December, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, the Governor of the Bank of England has made it clear that he currently thinks that such a move would do more damage than good and that more quantitative easing is the favoured tool if further action becomes necessary. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected in the near-term as economic recovery is expected to be only gradual and, therefore, prolonged. These forecasts were based on an assumption that a Brexit trade deal would be agreed by 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020: as this has now occurred, these forecasts do not need to be revised.

### **Gilt yields / PWLB rates**

There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was a heightened expectation that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020. In addition, there were growing expectations of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued. Combined, these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last thirty years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers. This means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. The consequence of this has been the gradual lowering of the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. Over the year prior to the coronavirus crisis, this has seen many bond yields up to 10 years turn negative in the Eurozone. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities.

Gilt yields had therefore already been on a generally falling trend up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies during March 2020. After gilt yields spiked up during the financial crisis in March, we have seen these yields fall sharply to unprecedented lows as investors panicked during March in selling shares in anticipation of impending recessions in western economies, and moved cash into safe haven assets i.e. government bonds. However, major western central banks took rapid action to deal with excessive stress in financial markets during March, and started massive quantitative easing purchases of government bonds: this also acted to put downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds. Such unprecedented levels of issuance in “normal” times would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. Gilt yields and PWLB rates have been at remarkably low rates so far during 2020/21.

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is expected to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as it will take economies, including the UK, a prolonged period to recover all the momentum they have lost in the sharp recession caused during the coronavirus shut down period. From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment, (as shown on 9<sup>th</sup> November when the first results of a successful COVID-19 vaccine trial were announced). Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

### **Investment and borrowing rates**

- **Investment returns** are likely to remain exceptionally low during 2021/22 with little increase in the following two years.
- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England: indeed, gilt yields up to 6 years were negative during most of the first half of 2020/21. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years. The unexpected increase of 100 bps in

PWLB rates on top of the then current margin over gilt yields of 80 bps in October 2019, required an initial major rethink of local authority treasury management strategy and risk management. However, in March 2020, the Government started a consultation process for reviewing the margins over gilt rates for PWLB borrowing for different types of local authority capital expenditure. *(Please note that Link has concerns over this approach, as the fundamental principle of local authority borrowing is that borrowing is a treasury management activity and individual sums that are borrowed are not linked to specific capital projects.)* It also introduced the following rates for borrowing for different types of capital expenditure: -

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 200 basis points (G+200bps)
  - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 180 basis points (G+180bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
  - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)
- As a consequence of these increases in margins, many local authorities decided to refrain from PWLB borrowing unless it was for HRA or local infrastructure financing, until such time as the review of margins was concluded.
  - On 25<sup>th</sup> November 2020, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates; the standard and certainty margins were reduced by 1% but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three year capital programme. The new margins over gilt yields are as follows: -
    - **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
    - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
    - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
    - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
    - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)
  - **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** As Link's long-term forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%, and all PWLB rates are under 2.00%, there is now value in borrowing from the PWLB for all types of capital expenditure for all maturity periods, especially as current rates are at historic lows. However, greater value can be obtained in borrowing for shorter maturity periods so the Council will assess its risk appetite in conjunction with budgetary pressures to reduce total interest costs. Longer-term borrowing could also be undertaken for the purpose of certainty, where that is desirable, or for flattening the profile of a heavily unbalanced maturity profile.
  - While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure in the longer term, to replace the rundown of reserves, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

### 3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2021/22 treasury operations. The Finance Manager will monitor

interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates, then borrowing will be postponed.*
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.*

Any decisions will be reported to the Finance and Assets Committee at the next available opportunity.

### **3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need**

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

### **3.6 New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing**

Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following sources for the following reasons:

- Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities out to 3 years or so – still cheaper than the Certainty Rate).
- Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of forward dates where the objective is to avoid a “cost of carry” or to achieve refinancing certainty over the next few years).
- Municipal Bonds Agency (possibly still a viable alternative depending on market circumstances prevailing at the time).

Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

### **3.7 Approved Sources of Long and Short term Borrowing**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Variable</b>
PWLB	●	●
Municipal bond agency	●	●
Local authorities	●	●
Banks	●	●
Pension funds	●	●
Insurance companies	●	●

## 4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

### 4.1 Investment policy – management of risk

The Council's investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return). The Council will aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity and with the Council's risk appetite. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs. However, where appropriate (from an internal as well as external perspective), the Council will also consider the value available in periods up to six months with high credit rated financial institutions, as well as wider range fund options.

The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA places a high priority on the management of risk. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.
2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "**credit default swaps**" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the financial sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
4. This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are two lists in appendix 5.4 under the categories of 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments.
  - **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year or have less than a year left to run to maturity, if originally they were classified as being non-specified investments solely due to the maturity period exceeding one year.
  - **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use.

5. **Non-specified and loan investment limits.** The Council has determined that it will not engage in any non-specific investments.
6. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the matrix table in paragraph 4.2.
7. **Transaction limits** are set for each type of investment in 4.2.
8. This authority will set a limit for its investments which are invested for **longer than 365 days**, (see paragraph 4.4).
9. Investments will only be placed with counterparties from countries with a specified minimum **sovereign rating**, (see paragraph 4.3).
10. This authority has engaged **external consultants**, (see paragraph 1.5), to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.
11. All investments will be denominated in **sterling**.
12. As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2020/21 under IFRS 9, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years ending 31<sup>st</sup> March 2023.

However, this authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 4.5). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

#### **Changes in risk management policy from last year.**

The above criteria are unchanged from last year.

#### **4.2 Creditworthiness policy**

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by the Link Group. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- "watches" and "outlooks" from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads that may give early warning of changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, and any assigned Watches and Outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads. The end product of this is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to



determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will, therefore, use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green not to be used
- No colour not to be used

*\* the yellow colour category is for UK Government debt, or its equivalent, money market funds and collateralised deposits where the collateral is UK Government debt*

The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information other than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically, the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a short-term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a long-term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances, consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored weekly. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap spreads against the iTraxx European Financials benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Link. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, as well as information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

The following counterparty limits were agreed in the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy, the same limits will be applied in 2021/22.

- £6 million with counterparties rated 6 months to 1 year (Orange) duration limit
- £5 million with Money Market Funds
- £6 million with counterparties rated up to 6 months (Red) duration limit on the approved weekly list

## Creditworthiness

Although the credit rating agencies changed their outlook on many UK banks from Stable to Negative during the quarter ended 30<sup>th</sup> June 2020 due to upcoming risks to banks' earnings and asset quality during the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the majority of ratings were affirmed due to the continuing strong credit profiles of major financial institutions, including UK banks. However, during Q1 and Q2 2020, banks made provisions for *expected* credit losses and the rating changes reflected these provisions. As we move into future quarters, more information will emerge on *actual* levels of credit losses. (Quarterly earnings reports are normally announced in the second half of the month following the end of the quarter.) This has the potential to cause rating agencies to revisit their initial rating adjustments earlier in the current year. These adjustments could be negative or positive, although it should also be borne in mind that banks went into this pandemic with strong balance sheets. This is predominantly a result of regulatory changes imposed on banks following the Great Financial Crisis. Indeed, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) report on 6<sup>th</sup> August revised down their expected credit losses for the UK banking sector to "somewhat less than £80bn". It stated that in its assessment, "banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC's central projection". The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC's projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

All three rating agencies have reviewed banks around the world with similar results in many countries of most banks being placed on Negative Outlook, but with a small number of actual downgrades.

## CDS prices

Although bank CDS prices, (these are market indicators of credit risk), spiked upwards at the end of March / early April 2020 due to the heightened market uncertainty and ensuing liquidity crisis that affected financial markets, they have returned to more average levels since then. Nevertheless, prices are still elevated compared to end-February 2020. Pricing is likely to remain volatile as uncertainty continues. However, sentiment can easily shift, so it will remain important to undertake continual monitoring of all aspects of risk and return in the current circumstances. Link monitor CDS prices as part of their creditworthiness service to local authorities and the Council has access to this information via its Link-provided Passport portal.

## 4.3 Other limits

Due care will be taken to consider the exposure of the Council's total investment portfolio to non-specified investments, countries, groups and sectors.

- a) **Non-specified treasury management investment limit.** The Council has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure of treasury management investments to non-specified treasury management investments as being 10% of the total treasury management investment portfolio.
- b) **Country limit.** The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK and from countries with a **minimum sovereign credit rating of AA-** from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.4. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.
- c) **Other limits.** In addition:

- no more than 30% will be placed with any non-UK country at any time;
- limits in place above will apply to a group of companies;
- sector limits will be monitored regularly for appropriateness.

#### 4.4 Investment strategy

**In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.
- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

#### Investment returns expectations.

Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.10% for a considerable period. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it is best to assume that investment earnings from money market-related instruments will be significantly below 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows (the long term forecast is for periods over 10 years in the future):

Average earnings in each year	
2020/21	0.10%
2021/22	0.10%
2022/23	0.10%
2023/24	0.10%
2024/25	0.25%
Long term later years	2.00%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus and how quickly successful vaccines may become available and widely administered to the population. It may also be affected by what, if any, deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, or a return of investor confidence in equities, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

## Negative investment rates

While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, and in November omitted any mention of negative rates in the minutes of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.

As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have continued to drift lower. Some managers have already resorted to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. Investor cash flow uncertainty, and the need to maintain liquidity in these unprecedented times, has meant there is a surfeit of money swilling around at the very short end of the market. This has seen a number of market operators, now including the DMADF, offer nil or negative rates for very short term maturities. This is not universal, and MMFs are still offering a marginally positive return, as are a number of financial institutions for investments at the very short end of the yield curve.

Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.

**Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicator and limit:

<b>Upper limit for principal sums invested for longer than 365 days</b>			
<b>£000</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
Principal sums invested for longer than 365 days	2,000	2,000	2,000
Current investments as at 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2020 in excess of 1 year maturing in each year	0	0	0

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access and notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits, (overnight to 100 days), in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

## 4.5 Investment performance / risk benchmarking

These benchmarks are simple guides to maximum risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose

of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the mid-year or Annual Report.

Security - The Council's main priority is the security of its capital, and therefore security risk continues to be its main focus, with the process for securing this detailed in Section 4.1 of this report.

This is measured / benchmarked by the use of a Historic Risk of Default calculation provided to us by Link Asset Services. The calculation is a proxy for the average percentage risk for each investment based on over 30 years of data provided by Fitch, Moody's and S&P. It simply provides a calculation of the possibility of average default against the historical default rates, adjusted for the time period within each year according to the maturity of the investment. At the end of December 2019 our calculated Historic Risk of Default was 0.0% as our cash was in either MMF, a deposit with Lloyds Bank of Scotland and a liquid call account with NatWest. As this situation is not expected to change in 2019/20, then the risk remains very small.

Liquidity – in respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- No Bank overdraft
- Liquid short term deposits of at least £5 million available with a week's notice.

Yield – The Council will use the 7-day LIBID compounded rate as an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio during 2019/20.

#### **4.6 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## 5 APPENDICES

1. Prudential and treasury indicators
2. Economic background
3. Treasury management practice – credit and counterparty risk management
4. Approved countries for investments
5. Treasury management scheme of delegation
6. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

## 5.1 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2021/22 – 2023/24

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### 5.1.1 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

#### Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long-term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

%	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
Annual Change	+3.724	+0.711	-0.216	+2.088	-0.250

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

While the above table is a statutory requirement for the Strategy document, when considering the increases in the cost of capital as a proportion of the revenue budget, it should be remembered that the majority of these costs has a direct impact of the Council's bottom line budget.

- Borrowing in relation to the Leisure Centre was funded initially from the use of internal reserves, but from 2020/21 from the management fee to be paid to the Council by the operator of the centre (including repaying the amount originally taken from reserve);
- The capital cost of the waste fleet will be charged to East Cambs Street Scene;
- The capital cost of the depot will be mostly be recovered from East Cambs Street Scene by way of an increase in rent;
- The loans to East Cambs Trading Company will generate an income to the Council as interest is being charged on this loan at a commercial rate of 3.5% in 2021/22.

## 5.2 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND


- **UK.** The key quarterly meeting of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5<sup>th</sup> November 2020. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5<sup>th</sup> November 2020 to 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2020 which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that “announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target”.
- Its forecasts appeared, at that time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
  - The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
  - The Bank also expected there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
  - CPI inflation was therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the “inflation risks were judged to be balanced”.
- Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it “stands ready to adjust monetary policy”, the MPC this time said that it will take “whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit”. The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank’s willingness to embrace new tools.
- One key addition to **the Bank’s forward guidance in August** was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that “it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably”. That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years’ time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase, (or decrease), through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years as it will take some years to eliminate spare capacity in the economy, and therefore for inflationary pressures to rise to cause the MPC concern. **Inflation** is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.
- However, the minutes did contain several references to **downside risks**. The MPC reiterated that the “recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to be skewed to the downside”. It also said “the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material”. Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. **Upside risks** included the early roll out of effective vaccines.
- **COVID-19 vaccines.** We had been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID-19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9<sup>th</sup> November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of




effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, this vaccine has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70c that impairs the speed of application to the general population. It has therefore been particularly welcome that the Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine has now also been approved which is much cheaper and only requires fridge temperatures for storage. The Government has 60m doses on order and is aiming to vaccinate at a rate of 2m people per week starting in January, though this rate is currently restricted by a bottleneck on vaccine production; (a new UK production facility is due to be completed in June).

- These announcements, plus expected further announcements that other vaccines could be approved soon, have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels; this would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could start to be eased, beginning possibly in Q2 2021 once vulnerable people and front-line workers have been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% in 2021 instead of 9%.
- **Public borrowing** was forecast in November by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.
- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. It is likely that the one month national lockdown that started on 5<sup>th</sup> November, will have caused a further contraction of 8% m/m in November so the economy may have then been 14% below its pre-crisis level.
- **December 2020 / January 2021**. Since then, there has been rapid back-tracking on easing restrictions due to the spread of a new mutation of the virus, and severe restrictions were imposed across all four nations. These restrictions were changed on 5.1.21 to national lockdowns of various initial lengths in each of the four nations

as the NHS was under extreme pressure. It is now likely that wide swathes of the UK will remain under these new restrictions for some months; this means that the near-term outlook for the economy is grim. However, the distribution of vaccines and the expected consequent removal of COVID-19 restrictions, should allow GDP to rebound rapidly in the second half of 2021 so that the economy could climb back to its pre-pandemic peak as soon as late in 2022. Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that in the second half of this decade, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The significant caveat is if another mutation of COVID-19 appears that defeats the current batch of vaccines. However, now that science and technology have caught up with understanding this virus, new vaccines ought to be able to be developed more quickly to counter such a development and vaccine production facilities are being ramped up around the world.



This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assumed that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perverse!), depress economic growth and recovery.




*(if unable to print in colour..... the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.*

- There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- **Brexit.** While the UK has been gripped by the long running saga of whether or not a deal would be made by 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020, the final agreement on 24<sup>th</sup> December 2020, followed by ratification by Parliament and all 27 EU countries in the following week, has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. As the forecasts in this report were based on an assumption of a Brexit agreement being reached, there is no need to amend these forecasts.
- **Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 17 December.** All nine Committee members voted to keep interest rates on hold at +0.10% and the Quantitative Easing (QE) target at £895bn. The MPC commented that the successful rollout of vaccines had reduced the downsides risks to the economy that it had highlighted in November. But this was caveated by it saying, “Although all members agreed that this would reduce downside risks, they placed different weights on the degree to which this was also expected to lead to stronger GDP growth in the central case.” So, while the vaccine is a positive development, in the eyes of the MPC at least, the economy is far from out of the woods. As a result of these continued concerns, the MPC voted to extend the availability of the Term Funding Scheme, (cheap borrowing), with additional incentives for small and medium size enterprises for six months from 30<sup>th</sup> April 2021 until 31<sup>st</sup> October 2021. (The MPC had assumed that a Brexit deal would be agreed.)
- **Fiscal policy.** In the same week as the MPC meeting, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -
  - An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
  - The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
  - The Budget on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2021 will lay out the “next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs”. This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).
- The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6<sup>th</sup> August 2020 revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.
- **US.** The result of **the November elections** meant that while the Democrats gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans could retain their slim majority in the Senate provided they keep hold

of two key seats in Georgia in elections in early January. If those two seats do swing to the Democrats, they will then control both Houses and President Biden will consequently have a free hand to determine policy and to implement his election manifesto.

- **The economy** had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a fourth wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the third wave in the Midwest looks as if it now abating. However, it also looks as if the virus is rising again in the rest of the country. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.



- The restrictions imposed to control the spread of the virus are once again weighing on the economy with employment growth slowing sharply in November and retail sales dropping back. The economy is set for further weakness in December and into the spring. However, a \$900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December will limit the downside through measures which included a second round of direct payments to households worth \$600 per person and a three-month extension of enhanced unemployment insurance (including a \$300 weekly top-up payment for all claimants). GDP growth is expected to rebound markedly from the second quarter of 2021 onwards as vaccines are rolled out on a widespread basis and restrictions are loosened.
- After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some*

*time.*" This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal.

- The Fed's meeting on **5 November** was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections. At its **16 December** meeting the Fed tweaked the guidance for its monthly asset quantitative easing purchases with the new language implying those purchases could continue for longer than previously believed. Nevertheless, with officials still projecting that inflation will only get back to 2.0% in 2023, the vast majority expect the fed funds rate to be still at near-zero until 2024 or later. Furthermore, officials think the balance of risks surrounding that median inflation forecast are firmly skewed to the downside. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields low – which will also have an influence on gilt yields in this country.
- **EU.** In early December, the figures for Q3 GDP confirmed that the economy staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns. This provides grounds for optimism about growth prospects for next year. In Q2, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by "only" 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4 and in Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries: it is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the countries most affected by the first wave.
- With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain

this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.

- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.
- **Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone.
- **World growth.** World growth will have been in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.
- Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply

products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

## Summary

**Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.**

**If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

## INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

**Brexit.** The interest rate forecasts provided by Link in paragraph 3.3 were predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. There is therefore no need to revise these forecasts now that a trade deal has been agreed. Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

### The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is still subject to some uncertainty due to the virus and the effect of any mutations, and how quick vaccines are in enabling a relaxation of restrictions.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

### Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact

most likely for “weaker” countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.

- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
- **German minority government & general election in 2021.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel’s CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she will remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU, and they had threatened to derail the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

#### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **UK** - a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.



### 5.3 TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to a maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum ‘high’ quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. The Council will not engage in any non-specific investments.

It should be noted that any funding provided to East Cambridgeshire Trading Company is given as a loan and treated as capital expenditure. It is **not** an investment, although clearly the Council does receive a return on the amount borrowed.

#### SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made, it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	** Max % of total investments / £ limit per institution	Max. maturity period
DMADF – UK Government	yellow	£6 million	6 months (max. is set by the DMO*)
UK Government gilts	yellow	£5 million	5 years
UK Government Treasury bills	yellow	£5 million	364 days (max. is set by the DMO*)
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	yellow	£5 million	5 years
Money Market Funds - CNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Money Market Funds - LNNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Money Market Funds - VNAV	AAA	£5 million	Liquid
Local authorities	yellow	£5 million	12 months

Term deposits with banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	£6 million £6 million £6 million Nil Nil	12 months 12 months 6 months 100 days Not for use
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\* DMO – is the Debt Management Office of H. M. Treasury

**Accounting treatment of investments.** The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

#### 5.4 APPROVED COUNTRIES FOR INVESTMENTS

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link credit worthiness service.

##### ***Based on lowest available rating***

###### AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

###### AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

###### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

###### AA-

- Belgium
- Hong Kong
- Qatar
- **U.K.**

## **5.5 TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION**

### **(i) Full Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Finance and Assets Committee (as the responsible body)**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) The Finance Manager and Section 151 Officer (as the person responsibility for treasury scrutiny)**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

## 5.6 THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER

### The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers,
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, and treasury management,
- ensuring that the capital strategy is sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money,
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority,
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing,
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources,
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and on-going risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities,
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees,
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority,
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above,
- creation of Treasury Management Practices that specifically deal with how non-treasury investments will be carried out and managed.